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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	DALE M. CENDALI (admitted for all purposes 11/30/93) DIANA M. TORRES (SBN 162284) O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP 400 South Hope Street Los Angeles, CA 90071-2899 Telephone: (213) 430-6000 Facsimile: (213) 430-6407 dtorres@omm.com CARLA MENINSKY (State Bar No. 2 O'Melveny & Myers LLP Embarcadero Center West 275 Battery Street, Suite 2600 San Francisco, CA 94111-3305 cmeninsky@omm.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs The United States Olympic Committee the International Olympic Committee	233470)
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12	UNITED STATE	ES DISTRICT COURT
13	NORTHERN DIST	TRICT OF CALIFORNIA
14	W : 10	G N G 00 02514 IGW
15	United States Olympic Committee and the International Olympic	Case No. C 08-03514 JSW
16	Committee,	[PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
17	Plaintiffs,	[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
18	V.	Date: August 22, 2008
19	Xclusive Leisure & Hospitality Ltd.; Beijingticketing.com; 2008-	Time: 9:00 a.m. Judge: Hon. Jeffrey S. White
20	Olympics.com; Beijingolympic2008tickets.com;	Judge. Hon. Jenney 5. Winte
21	Beijingolympictickets2008.com; Olympic-tickets.net;	
22	Olympicticketsbeijing2008.com; Does 1-10, inclusive,	
23	Defendants.	
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۷۵	CASE NO. C 08-03514 JSW	[PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PI

Case 3:08-cv-03514-JSW Document 63 Filed 08/25/08 Page 2 of 20 This case having come before the Court on August 22, 2008, and the Court 2 having heard the evidence and considered the arguments of counsel does hereby 3 make, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), the following 4 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: I. FINDINGS OF FACT 6 **A.** The Plaintiffs' Rights The USOC is the National Olympic Committee for the United States; 7 1. 8 as such, it coordinates the Olympic Movement in the United States, trains and 9 underwrites expenses for United States athletes at the Olympic Games and 10 Paralympic Games, and determines which United States city may present a bid to host the Olympic and Paralympic Games. (Burton $\P 5.$) 12 The IOC is an international, non-governmental, non-profit 13 organization and is the umbrella organization of the Olympic Movement. (Stupp ¶ 14 3.) Since 1896, when the first modern games were held in Athens, Greece, the IOC 15 has supervised the organization of the Olympic Games. (*Id.* ¶¶ 3-4.) 16 3. 17

- Since 1896, Plaintiffs and their predecessors have used certain words and symbols in connection with the Olympic Games, including the word OLYMPIC and the Olympic Rings symbol, which is the most recognized sports emblem in the United States. USOC research shows that more than 86% of the U.S. population can identify the Olympic Rings as the symbol for the Olympic Games. (Burton \P 8; Stupp \P 7.)
- In addition, Plaintiffs also use specific marks in connection with each 4. Olympic Games, including City & Year Marks, such as SYDNEY 2000, ATHENS

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As used herein, "Burton" refers to the declaration of Richard Burton filed July 22, 2008; "Lintumaa" refers to the declaration of Kai Lintumaa filed July 21, 2008; "Pei" refers to the

declaration of Lan Pei filed July 29, 2008; "Long" refers to the declaration of Fei Long filed July 22, 2008; "Schneider" refers to the declaration of Courtney Schneider filed July 22, 2008;

[&]quot;Meninsky" refers to the declaration of Carla Meninsky filed August 11, 2008; and "Stupp" refers to the declaration of Howard Stupp filed July 22, 2008.

at the point of purchase. (Lintumaa Ex. A.)

1	14. The Olympic Marks were used on the Websites and in the Secondary
2	Websites' domain names without Plaintiffs' consent. The websites also repeatedly
3	used the word marks OLYMPIC and BEIJING 2008 without Plaintiffs'
4	authorization. (Lintumaa Exs. A, D.)
5	15. The Websites prominently displayed in several locations a human
6	figure logo that closely resembles the Beijing 2008 Human Figure Logo. Directly
7	below each instance of the logo also display the words "BEIJING 2008" in a
8	typeface that closely resembles the Beijing 2008 Word Design. (Lintumaa Exs. A,
9	D.)
10	16. The Websites' use of the Olympic Marks misled the public into
11	believing that Defendants were operating an official Olympic ticket site. (See Pei ¶
12	2; Long ¶ 3.) Even a <i>Forbes Traveler</i> writer appeared to have been confused, as the
13	magazine reported in February, 2008 that:
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15 16	The safest bet is to go through the official ticketing websites, including www.beijingticketing.com , www.chinaolympic2008tickets.com, and www.beijing-2008tickets.com, www.cosport.com, or en.beijing2008.cn.
17	(Schneider Ex. A (emphasis added).)
18	17. The sole purpose of the Primary Website was to sell tickets to the
19	Olympic Games. The Primary Website offered no other good or service. Thus,
20	every instance of the Websites' use of the Olympic Marks appeared in the context
21	of an offer to sell tickets. (Lintumaa Ex. A.)
22	D. Defendants' Ticket Offers
23	18. The Primary Website offered for sale tickets in 39 categories of
24	Olympic events, including the Opening and Closing Ceremonies and 37 categories
25	of individual athletic competitions. (Lintumaa Ex. A.)
26	19. The tickets offered for sale ranged in price, from as low as \$100 for
27	early individual competitions, to as high as \$2150 per ticket for the Opening
28	Ceremonies. (Lintumaa ¶ 3.) When a user clicked on the links provided to select
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and purchase tickets, the user was redirected to a subpage of the Primary Website to select and purchase tickets. (*See id.* ¶¶ 2-3, 12-13.)

- 20. Many consumers have complained about having been deceived by the Websites. Each had purchased tickets to one or more events through the Websites but had not actually received any tickets. (*See*, *e.g.*, Pei \P 2-5; Long \P 2-8.)
- 21. A private investigator employed by Plaintiffs visited the Primary Website, ordered one ticket to the Opening Ceremony and another to a kayaking event, totaling \$1,905. Defendants did not ask the investigator for his photograph or passport details, as required by BOCOG's policy for admission (even with a valid ticket) to the Opening Ceremony, and neither provided such information. (Lintumaa ¶¶ 2-4.)
- 22. Accordingly, Defendants could not provide a would-be purchaser with tickets that would gain them admission to the Opening Ceremony under BOCOG's policy.²
- 23. In fact, Defendants did not provide the promised tickets. On August 3, 2008, Defendants sent purchasers an email confirming that no tickets would be delivered, ostensibly because Defendants' "supplier" had failed to supply Defendants with tickets. Rather than agree to refund the purchasers' money, Defendants suggested that the purchasers seek recompense from their credit card companies. (Meninsky Ex. A.)
- 24. Consumers who sought to purchase tickets from Defendants are less likely to purchase tickets or hospitality packages, and the USOC, which receives some incremental revenue from Jet Set Sports based on ticket sales, suffers directly as a result of Defendants' conduct. (Burton ¶¶ 16; Stupp ¶ 9.) More importantly, consumers who are defrauded by Defendants will likely be soured on their experience attempting to go to the Olympic Games, and thus their view of the Olympic organizations will be tarnished. (Burton ¶ 14; Stupp ¶ 16.)

E. Defendants' Efforts to Conceal Their Identities

- 25. Defendants are concealing from the public their true identities and contact information.
- 26. Each of the Websites lists XLH or X.L.& H. Ltd as the owner of the site with phone numbers in London, UK and offices in Phoenix, Arizona, but the address is false and none of the phone numbers leads to an operating telephone line. The websites further state that XLH is a Delaware Corporation, but XLH is not a corporation organized in Delaware or Arizona. (Lintumaa ¶¶ 7-8.)
- 27. Plaintiffs have notified Defendants of this action, this Court's temporary restraining order, and Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. (*See* Docket Nos. 16, 27, 30, 37, 41, 45, 52, 58, 60.)
- 28. If any of the foregoing findings of fact are deemed to be conclusions of law, they shall be incorporated herein as conclusions of law reached by this Court as though fully set forth as such.

II. <u>CONCLUSIONS OF LAW</u>

- 29. In the United States, the intellectual property rights to the words and symbols associated with the Olympic Games are statutorily protected not only by the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, *et seq.*, but by the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act (the "OASA") as well. *See* 36 U.S.C. § 220506(a). The OASA grants to the USOC the "exclusive right to use" various marks associated with the Olympic Games in the United States. It further authorizes the USOC to pursue a civil action against any person who uses the protected marks "for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition." 36 U.S.C. § 220506(c).
- 30. The marks protected by the OASA include the word OLYMPIC, as well as "any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely representing association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic Committee, the

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International Paralympic Committee, the Pan-American Sports Organization, or the [USOC]." 36 U.S.C. § 220506(a)(4), (c)(3) and (c)(4).

31. In order to obtain a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit, the moving party must show either "(1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the moving party." *Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.*, 240 F.3d 832, 841-840 (9th Cir. Cal. 2001). These standards "are not separate tests but the outer reaches of a single continuum." *Id.*

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

- Unauthorized Use of the Olympic Marks in Violation of the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act
- 32. Through the OASA, Congress has granted the USOC the exclusive right to use and control the commercial use of certain Olympic symbols. 36 U.S.C. § 220506; *see U.S.O.C. v. Intelicense Corp.*, 737 F.2d 263, 266-67 (2d Cir. 1984) (Congress intended to promote U.S. Olympic effort by providing USOC with "unfettered control over the commercial use of Olympic-related designations" and finding violation of the Act where defendant made commercial use of Olympic symbol without consent).
- 33. Under the statute, any person who uses any of the Olympic symbols without the USOC's consent "for purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition" is liable for damages in accordance with the remedies provided in the Lanham Act. 36 U.S.C. § 220506(c)(4).
- 34. The protected symbols include the words "Olympic" and "Olympiad," among others, or any combination of these words "tending to cause confusion or mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection" with any Olympic activity,

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and any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely representing association with the International Olympic Committee. 36 U.S.C. § 220506(a).

- 35. The statute establishes that the protection afforded to Olympic symbols is broader than the rights provided under the Lanham Act, effectively providing the USOC with an exclusive right in the Olympic words and symbols. *San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm.*, 483 U.S. 522, 535 (1987).
- 36. The statute does not require the USOC to prove that a defendant's use is likely to cause confusion, nor does the statute incorporate the defenses that are available under the Lanham Act. *Id.* Thus, under the OASA, the USOC has exclusive right to the use of all Olympic symbols and marks, including the official Beijing 2008 emblem, and the word marks "Beijing 2008" and "Olympic." These exclusive rights under OASA entitle Plaintiffs to injunctive relief here.

2. Infringement Under the Lanham Act

- 37. Until this Court issued a temporary restraining order, Defendants were making unauthorized use of Plaintiffs' marks on their Websites in an effort to mislead consumers into believing that the tickets offered are "official" and that the sites are legitimate and in fact associated with the IOC and USOC. Such deception of the public is forbidden by Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act.
- 38. Section 32(1) proscribes the use in commerce of any "reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 1114; *K and N Engineering, Inc. v. Bulat*, 259 Fed. Appx. 994 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming lower court's grant of summary judgment based on determination that defendants' intentional use of plaintiff's mark was likely to cause confusion).
- 39. Plaintiffs here have shown a significant likelihood of establishing actionable infringement, as they can demonstrate (1) ownership of valid and legally

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protectable marks; (2) that Defendants "used" those marks "in commerce"; (3) the "use in commerce" was in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods and services"; and (4) the infringing use was in a manner likely to confuse consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1114; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).

- 40. First, Plaintiffs' ownership of Reg. No. 3,043,229 for the official emblem for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games ("Beijing 2008"), Reg. Nos. 2,739,492 and 2,764,102; and Reg. Nos. 968,566, 2,311,493, and 2,777,890 for the word OLYMPIC constitute *prima facie* evidence of Plaintiffs' ownership of valid marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1115; *Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagon of Am., Inc.*, 457 F.3d 1062, 1064 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006).
- 41. Second, Plaintiffs have shown a significant likelihood of demonstrating that, by using Plaintiffs' marks on the Websites to sell tickets to consumers nationwide, Defendants are making use of the marks in commerce in connection with goods or services. *See Au-Tomotive Gold*, 457 F.3d at 1075.
- 42. Third, Plaintiffs have shown a significant likelihood of demonstrating the central element of trademark infringement—likelihood of confusion, *i.e.*, whether the similarity of the marks is likely to confuse customers about the source of the products or services. *Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.*, 174 F.3d 1036, 1061 (9th Cir. 1999).
- eight factors: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods or services; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods or services and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion. *AMF*, *Inc. Sleekcraft Boats*, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
- 44. In this case, each of the factors weighs in favor of Plaintiffs. Collectively, they overwhelmingly demonstrate a likelihood of confusion.

45. Here, there is no question that Plaintiffs' marks are strong. In fact, the Olympic Marks are so strong that Congress, by passing the OASA, has granted exclusive use of those marks in the United States to the USOC. The Olympic
exclusive use of those marks in the United States to the USOC. The Olympic
Marks are entitled to more protection because they are more likely to be
remembered and associated in the consumers' minds with their owners. Brookfield,
174 F.3d at 1058 (citations omitted).
46. Here, because Defendants purport to offer the <i>same</i> goods— <i>i.e.</i> ,
tickets to the 2008 Olympic Games—offered by the USOC, through its agents, the
parties' goods and services are highly related, and thus this factor also favors
Plaintiffs. AMF, 599 F.2d at 350.
47. There can also be no question that Defendants are making use of
trademarks that are identical to, or nearly identical to, Plaintiffs' marks. Thus, this
critical factor weighs in favor of Plaintiffs. Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay Inc., 506
F.3d 1165, 1174-76 (9th Cir. 2007).
48. While proof of actual confusion is not a prerequisite, <i>Eclipse</i>
Associates, Ltd. v. Data General Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1990),
even Forbes Traveler, as set forth in the article attached to the Declaration of
Courtney Schneider, believes <u>beijingticketing.com</u> is an official website. ³ Thus,
Plaintiffs have evidence of actual confusion, which "is persuasive proof that future
confusion is likely." AMF, 599 F.2d at 352 (citations omitted). Thus, this factor
weighs in Plaintiffs' favor.
49. "Convergent marketing channels increase the likelihood of confusion."
AMF, 599 F.2d at 353 (citations omitted). Where, as here, Plaintiffs and
Defendants sell their services to the same pool of customers, advertising in the
same media, this factor weighs in Plaintiffs' favor.

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³ See Schneider Ex. A ("The safest bet is to go through the official ticketing websites, including ... www.beijingticketing.com, ...").

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- 50. Here, the evidence of Defendants' bad faith is overwhelming. As set forth above, Defendants were deliberately using marks similar to Plaintiffs' Olympic Marks to deceive consumers, stating on their sites that the Websites sell "official tickets" to the Olympic Games, and have also concealed their identities, including by providing false contact information on the sites.
- 51. Where the products are identical and the marks are strongly similar, however, the sophistication of buyers <u>cannot</u> be relied on to prevent confusion, and this factor will not mitigate the likelihood of confusion. *See, e.g., Eclipse Associates*, 894 F.2d at 1118. Here, because Defendants are offering identical goods using marks that are nearly identical to Plaintiffs', this factor also weighs in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
- 52. In assessing likelihood of confusion, "a 'strong possibility' that either party may expand his business to compete with the other will weigh in favor of finding that the present use is infringing." *AMF*, 599 F.2d at 354 (citations omitted).
- 53. Here, Defendants already purport to sell tickets for the 2008 Olympics, which is precisely the domain of Plaintiffs and their contractually-authorized agents. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of Plaintiffs.
- 54. In sum, consideration of the relevant factors amply demonstrates that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that Defendants' attempt to capitalize on the success of Plaintiffs' business by using the same well-known trademarks for the very services that Plaintiffs are already offering in violation of section 32(1) of the Lanham Act.

3. False Endorsement and False Advertising

55. Plaintiffs have also shown that they are likely to establish that Defendants' conduct constitutes both false endorsement and false advertising under the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); § 1125(a)(1)(B).

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- 56. A false endorsement claim requires a showing that: (1) goods or services were involved; (2) interstate commerce was affected; and (3) there was a false designation of origin or false description of the goods or services. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). In establishing the last factor, the court will look for the plaintiff to show that there is a likelihood of confusion. *White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.*, 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
- 57. As set forth above, Plaintiffs have shown that Defendants are falsely claiming to sell in interstate commerce tickets for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, using Plaintiffs' registered Olympic marks and are claiming to sell "official tickets" to create the misimpression that Plaintiffs endorse or in some way approve of the Websites and authorize the sale of the tickets.
- 58. Defendants' use is both likely to cause and actually has caused confusion. Thus, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail with respect to their false endorsement claim. *See Wendt v. Host Int'l*, 125 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1997).
- 59. To show false advertising, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants: (1) use a false or misleading description of fact or representation of fact in a commercial advertisement about its own or another's product; (2) that has actually deceived or has the potential to deceive a significant portion of the audience; (3) the deception is material in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused the statement to enter interstate commerce; and (5) it is likely that some harm will result from the misrepresentation. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B); Southland Sod Farms v. Stoner Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit also requires that the plaintiff show that the injury was "competitive," i.e., harmful to the plaintiff's ability to compete with the defendant. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981).
- 60. Plaintiffs have shown a significant likelihood that they will prevail on the merits of their false advertising claim. Plaintiffs have shown a competitive

or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading

- advertising." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200. A business practice is unlawful "if it is forbidden by any law." *Olszewski v. Scripps Health*, 30 Cal. 4th 798, 827 (Cal. 2003). The UCL is "intended to protect competitors as well as consumers from unfair practices." *Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc.*, 30 Cal. 4th 303, 315 (Cal. 2003).
- 67. By defining unfair competition to include *any* "unlawful . . . business act or practice," a plaintiff can establish a cause of action of unfair competition under the UCL by demonstrating that the defendant violated other laws through its business practices. *Kasky v. Nike, Inc.*, 27 Cal. 4th 939, 949 (Cal. 2002). "To prevail on a false advertising or false designation of origin claim, a plaintiff need only show that members of the public are likely to be deceived." *Id.*; *Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.*, 135 Cal. App. 4th 663, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
- 68. Based on the facts set forth above, Plaintiffs are significantly likely to prevail on their claims under the UCL, as Defendants are deceiving the public about their affiliation with Plaintiffs and the legitimacy of the tickets they are advertising for sale.

B. Irreparable Harm

- 69. In trademark infringement actions, the Ninth Circuit has held that once the plaintiff has established a likelihood of confusion, irreparable harm is presumed. *GoTo.com*, 202 F.3d at 1209. This is because it is reasonable for the court to assume that continuing infringement will leave the plaintiff with a loss of control of its reputation and a loss of its goodwill. *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc.*, 725 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1984).
- 70. Because of their likely success on the merits, Plaintiffs are entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm.
- 71. Even absent the presumption, Plaintiffs have shown irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction. Prior to the issuance of the temporary restraining order, Defendants were usurping Plaintiffs' well-established brand name and good

Websites. See id., 725 F.2d at 526 (irreparable injury results from continuing infringement based on loss of control over reputation and a loss of goodwill).

- In addition to these obvious harms, a significant source of irreparable injury lies in the fact that Defendants are lessening the value of Plaintiffs' intellectual property, on which Plaintiffs rely for revenue, and harming Plaintiffs' relationships with their sponsors, consumers and other third parties. By making use of Plaintiffs' marks as set forth herein, Defendants' conduct diminishes the value of these rights.
 - 74. Thus, Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed without an injunction.

C. The Balance of Hardships

- 75. Because Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits and that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction, it is not necessary for the Court to consider whether the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of Plaintiffs and whether there are fair grounds for litigation. See GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1209.
- 76. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs can satisfy the alternate test as well: as discussed above, there are fair grounds for litigation, and the balance of hardships weighs strongly in Plaintiffs' favor. As set forth above, if the Court allows Defendants to continue to use Plaintiffs' marks in connection with their suspect business venture, Plaintiffs will be irreparably injured. See Apple Computer, 725 F.2d at 526.

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77. In contrast, Defendants have no legitimate business interest to protect, but rather have built a business on deliberately infringing conduct. Where the intent to infringe is clear, even if the defendant's entire business was built upon the infringing mark, the balance of hardships weighs in favor of the plaintiff. *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.*, 714 F.2d 1240, 1255 (3d Cir. 1983) (if reliance on infringing activity barred issuance of injunction, "a knowing infringer would be permitted to construct its business around its infringement, a result we cannot condone.").

D. Public Interest

- 78. In addition to the concerns of Plaintiffs and Defendants, this Court may also consider the public interest in the balance of hardships in an unfair competition suit. *See Brookfield*, 174 F.3d at 1066.
- 79. Thus, because consumers are being led to believe there is a relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants, when in reality none exists, and consumers are at risk of being defrauded, the public interest militates against allowing Defendants to continue to confuse consumers in this fashion. *See V.E.W.*, *Ltd. v. Karla Hour Couture*, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22742 (N.D. Ca. Dec. 16, 1997).
- 80. If any of the foregoing conclusions of law are deemed to be findings of fact, they shall be incorporated herein as factual findings by this Court as though fully set forth as such.

[PROPOSED] ORDER

On August 22, 2008, this Court conducted a hearing on Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. After full consideration of all papers filed in support of Plaintiffs' motion and all evidence presented at the hearing, and having granted Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order on July 24, 2008, the Court finds that there is **GOOD CAUSE** appearing to **GRANT** Plaintiffs' Order

1 for Preliminary Injunction, and finds as follows: 2 1. Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating that they are 3 likely to succeed on the merits of their claims against Defendants; 4 2. There is a reasonable inference that unless enjoined, Defendants 5 will continue to use Plaintiffs' trademarks to deceptively market and solicit sales of 6 tickets to the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing; 7 3. Defendants have caused and, if permitted to continue such 8 conduct unrestrained, Defendants will likely continue to cause, irreparable damage 9 and harm to Plaintiffs; 10 4. The harm to Plaintiffs if a Preliminary Injunction is not granted 11 far outweighs any harm that Defendants may suffer if it is granted; 12 5. The relief Plaintiffs request is in the public interest. 13 14 **PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION** 15 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Defendants and all persons and/or entities acting on their behalf, for their benefit or in active concert or participation 16 17 with them are **HEREBY ENJOINED** as follows: 18 1. They shall not display (1) the word mark OLYMPIC, U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 968,566, 2,311,493 and 2,777,890; (2) the word mark 19 20 BEIJING 2008, U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 2,739,492 and 2,764,102; or (3) 21 the official emblem of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, U.S. Trademark 22 Registration No. 3,043,229, or any part or variation thereof (the "Olympic Marks"), 23 or any terms that are confusingly similar thereto, on the Websites www.olympictickets.net, www.beijingticketing.com, www.beijingolympic2008tickets.com, 24 www.beijingolympictickets2008.com, www.olympicticketsbeijing2008.com, 25 www.2008-0lympics.com; and www.buy-olympic-tickets.co.uk or any other 26 27 Website; 28

Websites under the current domain names or under any other domain name:

1	www.olympic-tickets.net, www.beijingticketing.com,
2	www.beijingolympic2008tickets.com, www.beijingolympictickets2008.com,
3	www.olympicticketsbeijing2008.com, www.2008-0lympics.com; and www.buy-
4	olympic-tickets.co.uk; and
5	8. They shall not effect assignments or transfers, form new entities
6	or associations or utilize any other means or device for the purpose of
7	circumventing or otherwise avoiding prohibitions set forth herein.
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9	IT IS SO ORDERED.
10	Dated: August <u>25</u> , 2008
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12	By: White States District Court Judge
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